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Abstract 
Farmers at the beginning and consumers at the end of the marketing chain often suspect that 
imperfect competition in processing and retailing allows middlemen to abuse market power. 
Therefore, the existences of price asymmetries indicate an unbalanced relationship between 
increases and decreases for a product through the farm gate and retail stages. Price transmission can 
be defined as the relationship between prices in two related markets. Price transmission is used to 
demonstrate the effects of a price change in one market over another and provides information on 
the extent of markets. The special interest is whether the transmission is symmetric or asymmetric. A 
symmetric price transmission integrates markets vertically and horizontally and a change in prices in 
one market quickly reflected to another. But, if the price transmission between the specific stages of 
the supply chain is asymmetric, then the price changes at the production level are not passed to price 
changes at the processing and/or retail level quickly or fully as in the case of a symmetric 
transmission. Most publications on asymmetric price transmission refer to non-competitive market 
structures as an explanation for asymmetry. Market power and oligopolistic behavior can cause 
imperfect price transmission (Vavra and Goodvin 2005). Brown & Yücel (2000) consider oligopolistic 
firms that engage in unspoken collusion to maintain higher profits. Ward (1982) suggests that market 
power can lead to negative APT if oligopolists are reluctant to risk losing market share by increasing 
output prices. Market power would appear to be capable of leading to long lasting asymmetries in 
the magnitude of adjustment (Meyer Craubadel 2004:590). Therefore, the aim of the study is to test 
for raw milk and retail fluid milk price transmission in Turkey by employing the method of 
cointegration in the presence of asymmetric error correction. In analyzing the historical data, 
evidence on price transmission for liquid milk have been considered. Monthly data between 2005-
2014 for retail and raw milk prices are used. M-Tar and Tar and standard EG model of cointegration 
techniques are applied in order to capture the possible asymmetric relations.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The implication of the impact of rising food prices on households is an important issue. With quickly 
changing market structures the growing concentration and centralization of processing and retail 
firms the questions of how quickly are farm prices transmitted to the retail level and what is the 
incidence of costs on retail prices gain importance. Given the price is the primary mechanism in 
linked markets, the extent of adjustment and speed of shocks transmitted between producer and 
retailer prices is a significant factor showing the actions of actors at various market levels (Abdulai 
2002).  As indicated in Peltzman (2000), asymmetric price transmission is the rule rather than the 
exception, and much scholarly work has revealed that asymmetric price transmissions are quite 
common, especially in agriculture and farmers at the beginning and consumers at the end of the 
marketing chain often suspect that imperfect competition in processing and retailing that allows 
middlemen to abuse market power.  
Price transmission can be defined as the relationship between prices in two related markets. Price 
transmission is used to demonstrate the effects of a price change in one market over another and 
provides information on the extent of markets. The special interest is whether the transmission is 
symmetric or asymmetric. A symmetric price transmission integrates markets vertically and 
horizontally and a change in prices in one market quickly reflected to another. Therefore, a change in 
prices in one market will have an equal and immediate effect on the other related market.  But, if the 
price transmission between the specific stages of the supply chain is asymmetric, then the price 
changes at the production level are not passed to price changes at the processing and/or retail level 
quickly or fully as in the case of a symmetric transmission. 
There are a number of reasons for incomplete (asymmetric) price transmissions, such as asymmetric 
information among the firms (Bailey and Brorsen, 1989), market power and concentration at 
processing and retail levels (Peltzman, 2000; Meyer and Von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; Azzam, 1999), 
interaction between market power and economy of scale (Lloyd et al. ,2006), adjustment and menu 
costs ( Meyer and Von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004, Bailey and Brorsen, 1989). Also, supply shocks due to 
adverse weather conditions, political uncertainty can contribute the increasing prices and the 
immediate impact is a fall in the real income of the households in real terms (Ghoshray 2011). Most 
publications on asymmetric price transmission refer to non-competitive market structures such as 
market power and oligopolistic behavior as an explanation for asymmetry (Vavra and Goodvin 2005). 
Brown and Yucel (2000) consider oligopolistic firms that engage in unspoken collusion to maintain 
higher profits. Ward (1982) suggests that market power can lead to negative APT if oligopolists are 
reluctant to risk losing market share by increasing output prices. Market power would appear to be 
capable of leading to long lasting asymmetries in the magnitude of adjustment (Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel 2004:590).An important sign of the market power is the existence of price 
asymmetries which indicate an unbalanced relationship between the price increases and decreases 
for a product through the farm gate and retail stages. More specifically, price asymmetries could be 
negative or positive depending on its effect. A positive (negative) price asymmetry occurs when a 
decrease (increase) in prices at the farm level is not fully or immediately transmitted, but an increase 
(decrease) passes more quickly or fully on to the final consumer (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 
2004; Vavra and Goodwin, 2005).Price asymmetries are important because, usually, it negatively 
affects welfare (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; Hahn, 1990). In case of vertical asymmetric 
price transmission, consumers often feel increases in farm prices are more fully and rapidly 
transmitted to retail levels than equivalent decreases  (Kinnucan and Forker, 1987). Therefore, one 
can assume that in case of vertical asymmetries, the value is acquired not in the production stage but 
inside the supply chain, and that the real winners are not the producers or the consumers (end 
users), but the holders of the last stage, where the goods are sold to the final consumers. 
Price transmission is generally measured by price transmission elasticity. The price transmission 
elasticity has been estimated by regression models like unit root tests and error correction models 
(ECM) with threshold adjustment(see Meyer and con Crauben-Taubadel 2004, and Frey and 
Manera2007, for the literature on estimating price transmission).Here, threshold adjustment analysis 
has particular importance because it implies that movements toward long run equilibrium do not 
take place at all points in time but only when the divergence from equilibrium exceeds the threshold 
(Ghoshrey 2011). Abdulai (2002), used a TAR model and analyzed the Swiss pork market; Ghoshray 
(2002), estimated the APT for wheat export prices in major wheat-producing countries with a TAR and 
Mtar model; Jaffry (2004) analyzed the French hake value chain and concluded that retailers responded to 
positive changes in auction prices more quickly than they did to negative changes. Ghoshray test the 
presecence of asymmetry between the rice export prices of Vietnam and Thailand with a M-Tar model 
(2008) and also tests how international commodity prices are transmitted to domestic prices for 13 
country/commodity pairs by using a TAR/M-TAR model (2011). 
The aim of the study is to test for raw milk and retail fluid milk price transmission in Turkey by 
employing TAR and M-TAR specifications. The focus is on vertical APT (asymmetry in price 
transmission between different stages of a marketing chain), therefore a final error correction model 
of price transmission has been estimated. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the dairy sector in Turkey. Data, 
methodology and empirical results are provided in Section 3. In section 4 we discuss the relation 
between market structure and the asymmetric speed of price adjustment in the Turkish liquid milk 
market. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 5. 
2. Characteristics of the Turkish Fluid Milk Market 
In the last decade, dairy-processing industry in Turkey received a considerable investment, and the 
number of modern milk processing plants has increased. Many investments on the dairy processing 
industry become equipped with high technology, and the result was indeed an increase in the 
production of milk, altering the price of raw milk. Also, the industry observed new labels entering the 
market, with most of the retail chains had producing their own brands and starting to compete with 
the others in the market. Parallel to this increase in the number of processing firms, the amount of 
milk produced and processed has also increased. In this respect, there is eight dairy processing or 
affiliated companies among the top 500 Turkish companies. 
Turkey is among the 10 largest milk producers in the world (FAO 2014). The total annual milk 
production exceeds 18 billion liters in 2013. In 2013 of the total production, the collected milk by the 
industry is around 8 million tons and the registered milk production is 46.66 % of the total production 
in 2012 (SIS 2014). It is forecasted that 3 billion liters are used by farm families for their own 
consumption or processing, 1 billion liters are handled by street vendors, over 2 billion liters are 
processed by mandiras (small, simple processing establishments) and well over 3.5 billion liters are 
processed by medium and large-sized dairies (Dellal and Berkum, 2009). 
The production costs of milk are high in Turkey and raw-milk producers work with low-profit margins 
due to costs mostly on feed and other services. The producer revenue primarily consists of the sales 
of the milk, and secondarily, the sales of the animal (most dairy farms sell the male calves born by 
their cows and heifers), naturally making the cost of production undoubtedly important. Therefore, 
the key determinant of the profit is the cost of the production (Dairy 2012). But as the initial 
investment and production costs are high in Turkey (see Bor (2014) for details), the level of the raw 
milk price is undoubtedly important for farmer.   
Dairy products have an important role in the Turkish diet. Consumption level of liquid milk is very 
low; the most common form of milk consumption is yoghurt, followed by white cheese (feta type) 
and ayran, a liquid salted milk drink. The annual per capita consumption of milk amounts to 37.3 kg 
of milk equivalence that is low compared to other developed countries. In 2012 in EU-27 it is 288.3 kg 
and in North America it is 274 kg of milk equivalence (FAO 2014). Therefore, the final liquid milk 
prices on the retail shelves are important for the consumers. 
The consumers argue that the retail price of milk is high and the producers argue that the raw milk 
price is low in Turkey. The pricing behavior in the raw milk price at the farm gate and the fluid 
drinking milk prices at the retailer shelves are somehow interesting in Turkey. There is government 
intervention over the farm gate prices and the government uses a ceiling price of 1.15 TL (0.4356 
USD) per liter for the raw milk at the farm gate prices (April 2015) and also subsidize milk by giving 
0.06 TL (0.227 USD) per liter to the producer (these payments are done in every three months). But 
the retail prices (end user) are freely determined (average of 3.50 TL (1.325 USD) for daily fluid milk 
in April 2015) and there is no intervention by any authority.  Even the costs of distribution, 
processing, packaging etc. are considered, the difference between the farm gate and retail prices 
could not be easily explained. This situation raise the questions of how the farm prices are 
transmitted to the retail levels and if there is imperfect competition in processing and retailing 
sectors that allows middlemen to abuse market power.  
Figure 1 The Farm Gate and the Retail Price of Fluid Milk (averages of Daily and UHT milk together) 
between 2003/01-2014/12. 
 
Data obtained from Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat) 
The problem in the fluid milk market may be the volatile prices of inputs for the producers and the 
final prices for the consumers. Figure 1 shows that there is large marketing margin in the Turkish 
fluid milk market. If the daily milk sold in the markets are considered, even the margin increases. It is 
seen that, the retail price is being completely unrelated to the farm gate price below a certain 
threshold. Therefore, the two prices are related in a nonlinear manner so that increases in the farm 
gate price of the fluid milk are transmitted to the retail level but the decreases are transmitted 
slowly. So, one can assume that the retailers (as well as the processors) adjust prices partly to the 
changes in demand and supply freely.  
The marketing of the raw milk by the producers are restricted in Turkey. It means that, the producer 
and consumer direct relation is not available. Therefore, the small farmers could only operate 
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through small processors (mandiras) and/or supplying their production to the big processors. The big 
processors collect milk by their own cooled trucks and searches for suppliers of enough daily raw 
milk in order to decrease the transaction cost (not willing to collect partial quantities). Therefore, 
only middle and big dairy farms have little bargaining ability for the price and quality.   
The Turkish fluid milk market is concentrated. Only a few numbers of big and traditional brands (SEK, 
Danone, AOC, Yorsan, Ulker, Pinar) are competing in the market. Although there are new comers and 
especially in the UHT segment there are several retailers own brand, still the market is squeezed by 
the conventional ones. Also, in the retail sector, a few numbers of retailers are spread to country 
wide although some domestic brands are operating regionally. Anyway, especially at the 
central/crowd cities there are a few huge retailers are present and well known. So the above fluid 
milk brands are dominant on the shelves of these retailers.  
There is a rich literature on interactions along the dairy marketing chain, to the best of our 
knowledge, only a few studies investigate the farm-retail price transmission of fluid milk in Turkey. In 
recent paper, Bor et. all (2014) found a positive price asymmetry in the Turkish Fluid Milk market by 
applying a standard asymmetric ECM on the monthly price data between Jan. 2003 to Dec. 2012.The 
results of the paper imply that retailers as well as processors exercise significant market power in the 
Turkish milk market. 
3. Econometric Model 
The Engle and Granger two step method (1987) is employed to test for cointegration between two 
prices.  The test assumes symmetric adjustment. Two step methodology is used to estimate the long 
run equilibrium relationship. By using ordinary least squares method to estimate the long run 
relation is given by (1). 
RMPt =  + FGPt + t          (1) 
Here, RMP is the retail milk price and the FGP is the farm gate price of fluid milk.  RMP and RWMP 
are non-stationary I(1) prices, the estimated “” is an arbitrary constant accounts for transfer costs 
and quality differences,  the estimates “” is the price transmission elasticity and “” is the error 
term that may be serially correlated.   
Engle and Granger  (1987) show that cointegration exists if t I(0). Residuals from equation (1) are 
used to estimate the following relationship: 
t =t-1 + t           (2) 
 
Rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration ( 0) implies that the residuals in equation (1) 
are stationary. 
Enders and Siklos (2001) argue that if the adjustment is asymmetric, the standard tests for 
cointegration and its extensions are mis-specified and consider an alternative error correction 
specification called the threshold autoregressive (TAR)  model, in which equation (2) is replaced as: 
t = It1t-1+(1- It)2t-1 + t         (3) 
where It is the Heavyside indicator function such that: 
It=
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1
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0
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t
uif
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          (4) 
 is the estimated threshold. Here, 1 and 2 gives the speed of adjustment coefficients RMPt. The 
long run equilibrium is given by t=. If 1 = 2, the adjustment is symmetric. If not, one can say that 
there is negative asymmetry in the series. If 1 2   and t is above (under) its long run equilibrium, 
the adjustment will be 1 (2). Here, threshold has particular importance because it implies that 
movements toward long run equilibrium do not take place at all points in time but only when the 
divergence from equilibrium exceeds the threshold (Ghoshrey 2011). 
In equation (4), the heavyside indicator depends on the level of t-1 (Enders and Siklos 2001).  An 
alternative is suggested in Enders and Granger (1998) and Ender and Siklos (2001) such that, the 
threshold depends on the previous periods change in t-1 and t series exhibits more momentum in 
one direction called momentum-threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) model. Here, the heavyside 
indicator is set by using lagged changes in t. 
It =
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         (5) 
 
 
 
The consistency of equations (1), (4) and (5), allow an error correction representation: 
 
∆RMPt =    θ +  φ
+ECTt−1
+ + φ−ECTt−1
− + ∑ α+∆RMPt−i
+
n
i=1
+ ∑ α−∆RMPt−i
− + ∑ β+∆FGPt−i
+
n
i=1
+ 
n
i=1
∑ β+∆FGPt−i
+
n
i=1
+ ∑ β−∆FGPt−i
− + ϑt
n
i=1
                                                                                                        (6) 
 
 
All the lagged prices (RMP and FGP) are split into positive and negative components as indicated by 
“-“and “+” superscripts. The error correction terms “ECT” are constructed from the threshold 
cointegration regressions in equations (3), (4) and (5).  
4. Empricial Results 
 
In order to analyze the price asymmetry in the Turkish Dairy sector the average monthly farm gate 
milk prices (FGP) and average retail milk prices (RMP) are used for the period from January 2003 to 
December 2014. Both prices are obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). Figure 1 
shows the time plot of RMP and RWMP. As expected these two variables seem to be non-stationary. 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Retail and Farm Gate price series. 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. RMP FGP 
RMP 144 0.72 0.18 0.44 1.11 1.00 0.97 
FGP 144 1.86 0.38 1.27 2.82 0.97 1.00 
 
The descriptive statistics for the prices are reported in Table 1. The trend of the monthly milk prices 
is demonstrated through Figure 1. The correlation coefficient is 0.97 between the two prices over the 
whole study period. In recent years, the price margin between the two prices has become more 
stable, and the two prices have evolved to be more correlated. The non-stationary properties of the 
two prices are investigated using the ADF test. The lag length for the ADF test is decided by 
employing the AIC statistic test and Ljung–Box Q test. Enders (2004) is followed in determining 
whether a trend or constant should be included in the regression. The statistics state that unit roots 
cannot be rejected at the 1% level for the level forms of both the price variables but rejected for the 
first difference form (Table 2). Thus, it is concluded that both the raw milk prices and retail milk 
prices for Turkey are integrated of order one. 
Table 2 ADF Tests. 
 
Variables 
ADF Tests 
Level First Difference 
Without Trend With Trend Without Trend 
FGP 0.0586 (1)a 
[0.9614] 
-3,3540 (1) 
[0.0620] 
-7.6767 (0) 
[0.0000] 
RMP 3.6674 (6)b 
[0.9999] 
-4.2044 (1) 
[0.0057] 
-6.8704 (2) 
[0.0000] 
a
 Figures in parentheses are the optimal lag length chosen by the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). Max lag=12. 
b
 Figures in square brackets are p-values. 
 
Linear cointegration analyses are examined by employing Engle-Granger methodology. The Engle-
Granger cointegration test is performed through two steps. In the first step, the long-term 
relationship between the two milk prices is estimated, as specified in Equation(1).  
 
 
Table 3  Long-run Relation. 
Dependent variable: RMP 
Variable                                              Coeff.                                                             Std. Error 
Constant                                            0.3787                                                              0.0308 
FGP                                                     2.0554                                                              0.0418 
 
The estimate for the coefficient on the farm gate price of fluid milk () is 2.0554 (Table 3). In the 
second step, the paper uses residual to perform a unit root test with the specification in Equation 
(2).The AIC and Ljung–Box Q statistics show that one lag is sufficient to address the serial correlation 
(Table 4). The statistic from the unit root test is 0.404 and it is significant at the 1% level. Thus, the 
Engle-Granger approach also confirms that the two prices in Turkey are cointegrated. 
The nonlinear cointegration analysis is performed by employing the threshold autoregression 
models. Four models (i.e., TAR, MTAR and their consistent counterparts) are investigated and the 
results are reported in Table 4. In selecting an appropriate lag to address possible serial correction in 
the residual series, a maximum lag of 12 is specified. Finally, diagnostic analyses on the residuals 
through AIC, BIC and Ljung–Box Q statistics all reveal that a lag of three is sufficient. 
Table 4 Results of the threshold cointegration tests. 
Item                            TAR                    Consistent TAR                     MTAR                         Consistent MTAR 
Estimate 
Threshold                    0                             -0.013                                 0                                     -0.033 
1                                                 -0.096*                     -0.096*                           -0.072                               -0.116*** 
                                 (-1.796)                     (-1.805)                          (-1.418)                              (-3.013) 
2                                                 -0.11*                       -0.11*                            -0.131***                          -0.037 
                                 (-2.464)                     (-2.457)                         (-2.824)                              (-0.431) 
Diagnostics 
 
Total Obs.                   144                              144                                 144                                      144 
Coint. Obs.                 140                              140                                 140                                      140 
AIC                          -547.621                     -547.616                        -548.434                             -548.312 
BIC                          -529.971                     -529.966                        -530.785                             -530.662 
QLB (4)                          0.685                           0.685                              0.721                                  0.569 
QLB (8)                          0.657                           0.657                              0.721                                  0.548 
QLB (12)                        0.5                               0.5                                   0.556                                  0.428 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Φ(H0: 1=2=0)         4.223 ***                     4.22***                          4.64***                             4.577** 
  
QLB (p) denotes the significance level for the Ljung-Box Q statistic and tests serial correlation based 
on p autocorrelation coefficients. Φ is the threshold cointegration test with the critical values from 
Enders and Siklos (2001).  
 
In estimating the threshold values for consistent TAR and MTAR, the approach by Chan (1993) is 
employed. Accordingly, different lag specifications in the models do not have significant impact of 
the final threshold values selected. The variation of the sum of squared errors by threshold value for 
consistent MTAR with a lag of three is illustrated in Figure 2. Around the values of -0.04 and 0.03, the 
sum of squared errors is relatively low. The best threshold value with the lowest sum of squared 
errors is estimated to be -0.033 for the consistent MTAR model and -0.013 for the consistent TAR 
model respectively. Finally, while the four nonlinear threshold cointegration models have similar 
results (Table 4), the consistent MTAR model has the lower AIC statistic of -548.312 and the lower 
BIC statistic of -530.662 than those for consistent TAR model, and therefore, is chosen to be the best.  
Figure 2 Sum of squared errors by threshold value from the momentum threshold 
autoregression. 
 
Focusing on the results from the consistent MTAR model, the F-test for the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration has a statistic of 4.577 and it is significant at the 1% level. Thus, the raw and retail milk 
prices of Turkey are cointegrated with threshold adjustment. The F statistic for the null hypothesis of 
symmetric price transmission has a value of 2.489 and it is also significant at 10%1; therefore, the 
adjustment process is asymmetric when the both prices adjust to achieve the long-term equilibrium.  
Positive deviations from the long-term equilibrium resulting from increases or decreases in the prices 
(t-1≥-0.033) are eliminated at 11.6% per month. Negative deviations from the long-term 
equilibrium resulting from decreases or increases in the prices (t-1<-0.033) are eliminated at a rate 
of 3.7% per month. In other words, positive deviations take about 9 months (1/0.116 = 8.6 months) 
to be fully digested while negative deviations take 27 months. Therefore, there is substantially slower 
convergence for negative (below threshold) deviations from long-term equilibrium than positive 
(above threshold) deviations. 
Table 5 Results of the asymmetric error correction model with threshold cointegration. 
Item Estimate t-ratio 
Θ                            0 0.071 
α1
+ 0.178 1.303 
α2
+ -0.189 -1.443 
α3
+ 0.204 1.515 
α4
+ -0.137 -1.015 
α1
− 0.112 0.625 
α2
− 0.182 1.035 
α3
− -0.007 -0.04 
α4
− 0.004 0.025 
β1
+         0.289*** 5.229 
β2
+ -0.067 -1.024 
β3
+ -0.028 0.429 
β4
+                         -0.03 -0.484 
β1
− -0.093 1.057 
β2
−      -0.213** -2.208 
β3
− -0.026 -0.263 
β4
−  0.031 0.357 
φ+      0.042** 2.276 
φ− 0.027 0.617 
R2 0.404  
AIC -778.117  
BIC -719.428  
LB(4) 0.984  
LB(8) 0.994  
 
Given the consistent MTAR model is the best among these from the threshold cointegration 
analyses, the error correction terms are constructed using equations (3) and (5). The asymmetric 
error correction model with threshold cointegration is estimated and the results are reported in 
Table 5. Diagnostic analyses on the residuals with AIC, BIC and Ljung–Box Q statistics select a lag of 
four for the model. In the equation for raw milk, there is one coefficient significant at the 10% level 
                                                          
1
 The significance level for the null hypothesis of symmetric price transmission is confirmed with p-value of 
0.117 by performing asymmetric price transmission test with ECM which is not separately reported in our 
tables.  
(β+H6=2.855), and there is one coefficient significant at the 10 % level (α
+
2=2,489). The R
2statistic is 
0.404 for raw milk. The AIC statistic is -778.117 for raw milk.  
The hypotheses of Granger causality between the prices are assessed with F-tests. The F-statistic of 
1.103reveal that the price of raw milk does Granger cause the price of retail milk. Similarly, the F-
statistics of 2,489 for raw milk disclose that the lagged price series have significant impacts on its 
own price and the retail milk price has been dependent on the raw milk price in the previous periods.  
Several types of hypotheses are examined for asymmetric price transmission. The first one is the 
distributed lag asymmetric effect. In each price equation, the equality of the corresponding positive 
and negative coefficients for each of the four lags is tested; in total, there are eight F-tests for this 
hypothesis. Accordingly, one of them is significant at the 10% level. Distributed lag asymmetric effect 
is found for raw milk for its own price at lag two. Furthermore, the cumulative asymmetric effects are 
also examined. The largest F-statistic is 2.855 with a p-value of 0.09. Thus, there have been some 
distributed lag asymmetric effect and cumulative effects are also asymmetric.  
The final type of asymmetry examined is the momentum equilibrium adjustment path asymmetries. 
For raw milk, the F-statistic is 0.114, but it is not significant at the conventional level. The point 
estimates of the coefficients for the error correction terms are 0.042 for positive error correction 
term and 0.027 for the negative one. Both of them are not significant at the conventional level with 
the corresponding p-values of 2.276 and 0.617. Therefore, it seems that in the short term the price of 
raw milk has some different responding speed to positive and negative deviations but the difference 
is weak. 
5. Conclusions 
In this study, the price dynamics between raw milk and retail milk markets in Turkey is examined 
using threshold cointegration. The price adjustment in the short term is also analyzed through an 
asymmetric error correction model with threshold cointegration incorporated. The result from this 
study discloses in detail the price relationship between these two fluid milk markets over the last ten 
years. 
The transmission between the two prices has been asymmetric in both the long term and short term. 
The threshold cointegration analysis reveals that in the long term positive deviations of the price 
spread between the two markets take about 9 months to be fully digested, while negative deviations 
take 27 months. This result is consistent with the conclusions of positive asymmetry found in the 
majority of spatial price studies (Frey and Manera, 2007).  
Differences between the farm and retail prices could be tied to marketing costs across the supply 
chain and pricing policies associated with the market structure. But, when the long-run relationship 
between farm gate and retail prices are analyzed (Table 3), 1 % increases in the farm gate price, 
increases the retail milk prices by 2.05 %. This figure shows that the difference cannot be explained 
by marketing costs and may indicate a significant market power in the fluid milk market. Therefore, 
in this asymmetric case, the deviations can be the reason of the market power of the 
processors/retailers in the sector.  
Raw milk market has been the price leader of the fluid milk market in Turkey and its price has been 
evolving more independently. This is revealed by the Granger causality test and the insignificant 
response to long-term price deviation by raw milk market. As explained in section 2, because 
marketing of the raw milk by the producers are restricted in Turkey and there is government 
intervention to raw milk prices, the processors/retailers have unequal bargaining power over the 
producers. Also producers keep their raw milk in the cooling tanks, where it stays fresh only a few 
days so need to be sold fast. As the processing industry is concentrated and the structure of unions 
and cooperatives are ineffective, the producers of raw milk work under contracts and, inevitably 
have little bargaining over the processors. This implies that the farm price of milk is mainly 
determined by the industry, due to the little market power of the farmers. On the consumption side, 
the milk can stay fresh for several months on the shelves in UHT (ultra-High Treatment) packets 
causing processors/retailers benefiting from a greater elasticity than producers. Also, there is no 
intervention to the fluid milk by the government and the prices on the shelves are freely determined.  
Intuitively, this means that price increases are passed on to the consumer, while there is slower and 
incomplete transmission of price decreases so consumers may not benefit from price reductions.  
To sum up Turkey have opportunities to improve the dairy sector and to achieve modern standards 
in means of production and structure of dairy farms. But the problem arises firstly from the high cost 
of production/low farm gate prices and secondly from the high fluid milk prices on the shelves.  As 
the small structure of dairy farms in Turkey are considered, because the capital requirements of 
building or improving a dairy farm are hard to reach for small farmers, a system of effective 
marketing and production agricultural cooperatives could be organized in the longer term. By that 
way the producers could gain bargaining power over processors and also could reach to final 
consumer directly. This can help to depreciate the power of the processors and the retailers over 
producers and consumers.  
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